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Clayton Hutchins, Q.C. Discretion of a Trial Judge...
in Trial to Exclude Otherwise
Admissible Evidence
The divers, and diverse, opinions of the English judiciary over the
last quarter of a century as to the existence and scope of the
discretion of a trial judge in a criminal trial to exclude evidence had
created a state of uncertainty in this area of evidentiary law. That
uncertainty has been largely dispelled by the recent decision of the
House of Lords in R. v. Sang. 1
The facts are these. Sang was charged with conspiracy to utter
counterfeit American banknotes. On his arraignment he pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Then, in the absence of the jury, his counsel
alleged that Sang had been induced to commit the offence by an
informer acting on the instruction of the police, and that, but for
such inducement, he would not have committed the offence
charged.
The defence counsel had made this submission at the outset of the
trial because he was faced by a number of decisions2 of the Criminal
Division of the Court of Appeal to the effect that "entrapment" is
no defence in English law. The defence counsel sought by his
submission to achieve the same effect as if entrapment were a valid
defence.
In his submission the defence counsel contended that if the judge
were satisfied that the offence was instigated by an informer acting
on the instructions of the police and but for this the offence would
not have been committed by the accused the trial judge had a
discretion to refuse to allow the prosecution to adduce evidence of
the commission of the offence.
The trial judge heard legal submissions on the question and ruled
that he had no discretion to exclude the prosecution's evidence. As a
result of this ruling Sang withdrew his plea of not guilty and pleaded
guilty.
The appeal to the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal was
dismissed. However, as a result of its review of previous cases on
*Clayton Hutchins, Q.C. Professor of Law, Dalhousie Law School
1. [1979] 2 All E.R. 1222 (H.L.)
2. R. v. McEvilly, R. v. Lee (1973) 60 Cr. App. R. 150 (C.A.)
R. V.Mealey, R. v. Sheridan (1974) 60 Cr. App. R.59 (C.A.)
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the issue of the trial judge's discretion to exclude in a criminal trial
the Court of Appeal certified as the point of law of general
importance involved in their decision a much wider question than is
involved in the use of agents provocateurs. This question was stated
as follows:
"Does a trial judge have a discretion to refuse to allow evidence,
being evidence other than evidence of admission, to be given in any
circumstances in which such evidence is relevant and of more than
minimal probative value?"
Moreover, as pointed out by Lord Diplock, the Law Lords
understood the question "as enquiring what are the circumstances,
if there be any, in which such a discretion arises; and as not being
confined to trials by jury." 3
The narrower point of law concerning the validity or otherwise of
the argument of the defence counsel, was dealt with briefly by the
Law Lords. Lord Diplock disposed of the point of law in the
following words:
"I understand your Lordships to be agreed that whatever be the
ambit of the judicial discretion to exclude admissible evidence it
does not extend to excluding evidence of a crime because the
crime was instigated by an agent provocateur. "4
The Law Lords wrote irfdividual judgments in the case. However,
all the Law Lords agreed with the answer given by Lord Diplock to
the certified question.
In light of this unanimous decision by the Law Lords I propose to
consider the judgment of Lord Diplock in some detail.
Lord Diplock initially notes that the recognition of a discretion in
the trial judge to exclude had grown up piecemeal. He states that it
appeared first in cases5 arising under s. 1 proviso (f) of the Criminal
Evidence Act 1898 which concerns the cross-examination of an
accused as to his previous convictions or bad character.
Next he notes the existence of a judicial discretion to exclude
evidence of similar facts was recognized by Lord du Parcq in Noor
Mohamed v. R. 6 and by Viscount Simon in Harris v. Director of
Public Prosecutions.7
3. Supra, footnote 1, atp. 1225
4. Ibid., atp. 1226
5. R. v. Watson (1913), 109 L.T. 335 (C.C.A.) Selvey v. Director of Public
Prosecutions, [1968] 2 All E.R. 497 (H.L.)
6. [1949] 1 All E.R. 365, [1949] A.C. 182 (P.C.)
7. [1952] 1 All E.R. 1044, [1952] A.C. 694(H.L.)
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Having reviewed the case law, Lord Diplock concludes that a
general rule of practice has developed whereby in a trial by jury the
judge has a discretion to exclude evidence which, though
technically admissible, would probably have a prejudicial influence
on the minds of the jury, which would be out of proportion to its
true evidential value.
He queries whether the discretion should be held to extend more
widely than that recognized as a general rule of practice despite the
comparatively recent dicta that suggest that it does.
The recent dicta is then considered. He notes that the following
statement by Lord Goddard in Kuruma, Son of Kaniu v. R. 8 has
been regarded as "the fountain-head" of all the recent dicta:
"No doubt in a criminal case the judge always has a discretion to
disallow evidence if the strict rules of admissibility would operate
unfairly against the accused. This was emphasized in the case
before this Board of Noor Mohamed v. Regem, and in the recent
case in the House of Lords of Harris v. Director of Public
Prosecutions. If, for instance, some admission of some piece of
evidence, e.g. a document had been obtained from a defendant
by a trick, no doubt the judge might properly rule it out." 9
While he observes that the only case that had been brought to
their Lordships' attention in which an appellate court had actually
excluded evidence on the ground that it had been unfairly obtained
was R. v. Payne, 10 he does allow that there is an unbroken series of
dicta in judgments of appellate courts since Kuruma to the effect
that there is a judicial discretion to exclude admissible evidence
which has been obtained unfairly or by trickery or oppressively.
Lord Diplock then expresses his opinion on the intended scope of
the above-mentioned statement of Lord Goddard in the following
terms:
"That statement was not, in my view, ever intended to
acknowledge the existence of any wider discretion than to
exclude (1) admissible evidence which would probably have a
prejudicial influence on the minds of the jury that would be out of
proportion to its true evidential value and (2) evidence
tantamount to a self-incriminatory admission which was obtained
from the defendant, after the offence had been committed by
means which would justify a judge in excluding an actual
confession which had the like self-incriminating effect.""
8. [1955] 1 All E.R. 236, [1955] A.C. 197 (P.C.)
9. Ibid., at p. 239, All E.R.
10. [1963] 1 All E.R. 848; [1963] 1 WLR 637 (C.C.A.)
11. Supra, footnote 1, at p. 1229-1230
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Having thereby restricted the scope of Lord Goddard's statement,
Lord Diplock answers the certified question in the following words:
"(1) a trial judge in a criminal trial has always a discretion to
refuse to admit evidence if in his opinion its prejudicial effect
outweighs its probative value.
(2) Save with regard to admissions and confessions and generally
with regard to evidence obtained from the accused after
commission of the offence, he has no discretion to refuse to admit
relevant admissible evidence on the ground that it was obtained
by improper or unfair means. The court is not concerned with
how it was obtained.."12
In my opinion, there are at least two aspects of Lord Diplock's
judgment which would be of interest to those who preside over or
appear as counsel in criminal trials in Canada.
Firstly, there is a marked sirmilarity between Lord Diplock's
description of the function of a judge at a criminal trial as respects
the admission of evidence and that of Martland, J. in The Queen v.
Wray. 13
Martland, J. described the function as follows:
"The exercise of a discretion of that kind [i.e. to disallow
evidence if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly
against an accused] is a part of the function of the Court to ensure
that the accused has a fair trial. But other than that, in my
opinion, under our law, the function of the Court is to determine
the issue before it, on the evidence admissible in law, and it does
not extend to the exclusion of admissible evidence for any other
reason. " '1
4
And later in his reasons:
"In cases such as R. v. Court and R. v. Payne, I think confusion
has arisen between 'unfairness' in the method of obtaining
evidence, and 'unfairness' in the actual trial of the accused by
reason of its admission. The result of those two cases was in
effect to render inadmissible evidence which the ratio decidendi
of the Kuruma case had held to be admissible. The view which
they express would replace the Noor Mohamed test, based on the
duty of a trial judge to ensure that the minds of the jury be not
prejudiced by evidence of little probative value, but of great
prejudicial effect by the test as to whether evidence, the probative
value of which is unimpeachable, was obtained by methods
which the trial judge, in his own discretion, considers to be
unfair. Exclusion of evidence on this ground has nothing
12. Ibid., atp. 1231
13. [1971] S.C.R. 272, [1970] 4 C.C.C. 1, 11 D.L.R. (3d) 673
14. Ibid., at pp. 685-686 D.L.R.
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whatever to do with the duty of a trial judge to secure a fair trial
for the accused."15
Compare that description of the function with the following
passages from Lord Diplock's judgment:
".... the function of the judge at a criminal trial as respects the
admission of evidence is to ensure that the accused has a fair trial
according to law. It is no part of a judge's function to exercise
disciplinary powers over the police or prosecution as respects the
way in which evidence to be used at the trial is obtained by them.
If it was obtained illegally there will be a remedy in civil law; if it
was obtained legally but in breach of the rules of conduct for the
police, this is a matter for the appropriate disciplinary authority to
deal with. What the judge at the trial is concerned with is not how
the evidence sought to be adduced by the prosecution has been
obtained but with how it is used by the prosecution at the trial.
A fair trial according to law involves, in the case of a trial on
indictment, that it should take place before a judge and a jury,
that the case against the accused should be proved to the
satisfaction of the jury beyond reasonable doubt on evidence that
is admissible in law; and, as a corollary to this, that there should
be excluded from the jury information about the accused which is
out of proportion to the true probative value of admissible
evidence conveying that information. If these conditions are
fulfilled and the jury receive correct instructions from the judge
as to the law applicable to the case, the requirement that the
accused should have a fair trial according to law is, in my view,
satisfied ...However much the judge may dislike the way in
which a particular piece of evidence was obtained before
proceedings were commenced, if it is admissible evidence
probative of the accused's guilt it is no part of his judicial
function to exclude it for this reason. ."16
Secondly, there is a clearly discernible but significant difference
in the enunciations of Martland, J. in The Queen v. Wray and of
Lord Diplock in the first paragraph of his answer to the certified
question inR. v. Sang as to the scope of the trial judge's discretion.
In The Queen v. Wray Martland, J. had this to say:
"In my opinion, the recognition of a discretion to exclude
admissible evidence, beyond the limited scope recognized in the
Noor Mohamed case, is not warranted by authority, and would be
undesirable. The admission of relevant admissible evidence of
probative value should not be prevented except within the very
limited sphere recognized in that case." 1 
7
15. Ibid., atp. 691 D.L.R.
16. Supra, footnote 1, atp. 1230
17. Supra, footnote 13, atp. 691-2 D.L.R.
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The limited scope of the discretion recognized in the Noor
Mohamed case is described by Lord du Parcq in the following
passage from that case:
"It is right to add, however, that in all such cases the judge ought
to consider whether the evidence which it is proposed to adduce
is sufficiently substantial, having regard to the purpose to which
it is professedly directed, to make it desirable in the interest of
justice that it should be admitted. If so far as that purpose is
concerned, it can in the circumstances of the case have only
trifling weight, the judge will be right to exclude it. To say this is
not to confuse weight with admissibility. The distinction is plain,
but cases must occur in which it would be unjust to admit
evidence of a character gravely prejudicial to the accused even
though there may be some tenuous ground for holding it
technically admissible. The decision must then be left to the
discretion and the sense of fairness of the judge." 18
In other words, in a case where the evidence would only have
trifling weight if admitted but would be gravely prejudicial to the
accused Lord du Parcq and Martland J. would agree that the trial
judge has the discretion to exclude that evidence.
On the other hand Lord Diplock states that the discretion arises
where, in the opinion of the trial judge, the prejudicial effect of the
evidence outweighs its probative value.
Lord Diplock, in his description of the scope of the discretion is
in effect referring with approval to what Viscount Simon had said in
the following passage from his judgment in Harris v. Director of
Public Prosecutions:
"This second proposition flows from the duty of the judge when
trying a charge of crime to set the essentials of justice above the
technical rule if the strict application of the latter would operate
unfairly against the accused. If such a case arose, the judge may
intimate to the prosecution that evidence of 'similar facts'
affecting the accused, though admissible, should not be pressed
because its probable effect would be out of proportion to its true
evidential value." (per Lord Moulton in Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Christie, (1914) 24 Cox C.C. 249,257). Such an
intimation rests entirely within the discretion of the judge." 19
Thus, what difference there is between the scope of the discretion
approved by Martland, J. speaking for the majority in The Queen v.
Wray, and Lord Diplock speaking for all the Law Lords in R. v.
Sang is to be found by a comparison of the scope of the discretion as
18. Supra, footnote 6, atp. 370 All E.R.
19. Supra, footnote7, atp. 1048 All E.R.
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described in the aforementioned passages by Lord du Parcq in Noor
Mohamed and Viscount Simon in Harris v. Director of Public
Prosecutions.
In that regard, I think it is apparent, as it was to Lord Diplock,
that Lord du Parcq's description of the scope of the discretion was
rather more narrowly stated than that of Viscount Simon.
The difference obviously lies in Lord du Parcq's use of the terms
"trifling weight" and "gravely prejudicial" to describe evidence in
respect of which a discretion to exclude arises whereas Viscount
Simon simply said that the prejudicial influence of the evidence on
the minds of the jury need only be out of proportion to its true
evidential value.
However, there is still some uncertainty as to the extent of the
difference since Lord Diplock in stating the general rule of practice
uses the expression "out of proportion" whereas in describing the
discretion at the end of his judgment he uses the expression
"outweighs". On the other hand, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton while
agreeing with Lord Diplock's description of the discretion
interpreted the expression "out of proportion to its true evidential
value" in the following manner:
"I read the latter expression as meaning that the discretion can be
exercised where the prejudicial value of the evidence would
greatly exceed its probative value.' '20
Perhaps of greater significance in a comparison of the Canadian
and British position concerning the scope of the discretion is the
second paragraph of Lord Diplock's answer to the certified
question, and more particularly the words "Save . . . generally
with regard to evidence obtained from the accused after commission
of the offence, he has no discretion. .... "
To what kind of evidence is Lord Diplock referring?
In expressing his opinion on the intended scope of Lord
Goddard's statement in Kuruma Son of Kaniu v. R. he made
reference not only to "admissible evidence which would probably
have a prejudicial influence on the minds of the jury that would be
out of proportion to its true evidential value" but also to "evidence
tantamount to a self-incriminatory admission which was obtained
from the defendant, after the offence has been committed by means
which would justify a judge in excluding an actual confession which
had the like self-incriminating effect."
20. Supra, footnote 1, at p. 1239
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It is apparent, I suggest, to what kind of evidence Lord Diplock is
referring when one considers the following paragraph from his
judgment:
"My Lords, I propose to exclude, as the certified question does,
detailed consideration of the role of the trial judge in relation to
confessions and evidence obtained from the defendant after
commission of the offence that is tantamount to a confession. It
has a long history dating back to the days before the existence of
a disciplined police force when a prisoner on a charge of felony
could not be represented by counsel and was not entitled to give
evidence in his own defence either to deny that he had made the
confession, which was generally oral, or to deny that its contents
were true. The underlying rationale of this branch of the criminal
law, though it may originally have been based on ensuring the
reliability of confessions is, in my view, now to be found in the
maxim, nemo debet prodere se ipsum, no one can be required to
be his own betrayer, or in its popular English mistranslation 'the
right to silence'. That is why there is no discretion to exclude
evidence discovered as the result of an illegal search but there is
discretion to exclude evidence which the accused has been
induced to produce voluntarily if the method of inducement was
unfair.' '21
It is suggested that Lord Diplock might have been thinking of a
case such as R. v. Barker22 where it was held by the English Court
of Criminal Appeal that fraudulently prepared documents produced
to a tax inspector stood "on precisely the same footing as an oral or
written confession which is brought into existence as the result of
such promise, inducement or threat" 23 or alternatively of the
English position with respect to the admissibility of evidence
obtained as a consequence of an inadmissible confession as
reflected by the court in R. v. Warickshall24 declaring:
"Facts thus obtained, however, must be fully and satisfactorily
proved, without calling in the aid of any part of the confession
from which they may have been derived.' '25
However, it is also apparent, I suggest, that Lord Diplock is not
approving the descriptions of the scope of the discretion given by
Lord Parker C.J. in Callis v. Gunn2 6 when he said:
21. Ibid., atp. 1230
22. [194113 All E.R. 33, [1941] 2 K.B. 381 (C.C.A.)
23. Ibid., atpp. 36-37 All E.R.
24. (1783) 1 Leach 263, 168 E.R. 234
25. Ibid., at p. 264 Leach
26. [1963] 3 All E.R. 677, [1964 I Q.B. 495 (D.C.)
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" in considering whether admissibility would operate
unfairly against a defendant, one would certainly consider
whether it has been obtained in an oppressive manner, by force or
against the wishes of an accused person. That is the general
principle."
2 7
Or again that the discretion
"would certainly be exercised by excluding the evidence if there
was any suggestion of it having been obtained oppressively, by
false representations, by a trick, by threats, by bribes, anything
of that sort"
28
nor is he approving a similar view of the ambit of the discretion
expressed by Lord Widgery C.J. in Jeffrey v. Black. 2
9
Rather the discretion to exclude to which he is referring in the
second paragraph of his answer relates only to the obtaining of
evidence from the accused which the accused has been induced to
produce voluntarily and the trial judge considers that the method of
inducement was unfair because the rule against self-incrimination is
likely to have been infringed.
In any event it is clear from the above-mentioned passage30 from
the judgment of Martland J. in The Queen v. Wray that there is no




27. Ibid., at p. 680 All E.R.
28. Ibid., atp. 681 All E.R.
29. [1978 11 All E.R. 555 at 559
30. Supra, footnote 17
